Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Description

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.

Details

Author(s)
Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson
Format
Paperback | 434 pages
Dimensions
155 x 231 x 25mm | 610g
Publication date
18 May 2010
Publisher
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Publication City/Country
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Language
English
Edition statement
Reprint
Illustrations note
43 Line drawings, unspecified
ISBN10
0521671426
ISBN13
9780521671422
Bestsellers rank
172,559